I. Judicial Review and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB: The Judiciary vs. the Executive
In the view of the majority of the FCC, the independence of the ECB constitutes a deviation from the concept of democracy enshrined in Articles 20 and 79(3) of the Basic Law. It considers such independence to be in conformity with said concept of democracy only under the condition that it is tied to a narrowly interpreted legal mandate and subject to full judicial review. 11 One might challenge this view from two different angles.
First, the "constitutionalization" of ECB independence in Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in Article 88 of the Basic Law do not require the full judicial review of ECB measures. Prior to the Economic and Monetary Union, the independence of the Bundesbank was based on a simple legislative provision. 12 The 5 See infra Part B.
6 See infra Part C. 
2014]
Adjudicating Economics? 267
Bundestag was considered to be entitled to delegate its powers over monetary policy to an independent institution. Obviously, the possibility to modify or revoke the delegation sufficed in order for such delegation to be considered constitutional. 13 At the time, it would have been possible to give the Bundesbank a mandate for discretionary monetary policy instead of rules-based monetary policy, or to give it a mandate similar to that of the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve which does not give preference to price stability.
14 The Basic Law would not have provided an obstacle to such mandates because monetary policy does not directly affect fundamental rights like the right to property. 15 In such a situation, the constitutional requirement for the legislature to determine the essential elements of a policy and not to delegate away this task (Wesentlichkeitslehre) does not apply with full force. 16 The "constitutionalization" of ECB independence in Article 130 TFEU and in Article 88 of the Basic Law did not put these considerations upside down. Certainly, these provisions make parliamentary control over the exercise of monetary policy considerably more burdensome. The revocation of the powers delegated to the ECB now requires an amendment of the treaties and the constitution. But this constituted the very point of the "constitutionalization" of central bank independence at the occasion of the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. Germany wanted to cement the independence of the ECB in order to ensure that it follows the politics of price stability cherished by Bundesbank. 17 As a constitutional provision, the requirement of an independent ECB in Article 88 of the Basic Law has since qualified the concept of democracy defined as popular sovereignty in Article 20(2) of the Basic Law in an important respect. The FCC reached this conclusion in its Maastricht judgment by way of a systematic interpretation of all relevant constitutional provisions. 18 Hence, the Basic Law does not necessarily warrant a narrow reading of the ECB's mandate or a rigorous judicial review. Contrary to this understanding, the FCC now identifies ECB independence as a deviation from the concept of democracy 13 
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endorsed by the Basic Law. 19 This interpretation is one-sided in that it does not take account of the constitutional quality of Article 88 of the Basic Law and leads to an inappropriately high standard of judicial review.
Second, even though the concept of democracy resulting from a systematic reading of Articles 20(2) and 88 of the Basic Law seems to require the ECB to follow a rules-based approach and to rule out a discretionary approach, it does not necessarily ensue that the FCC or the ECJ should apply an overly strict standard of review. Monetary policy is not just any administrative activity that requires being subjected to full judicial review in order to ensure respect for individual rights. Rather, the making of monetary policy resembles that of any other economic policy. It involves forward-looking estimates about economic growth and risks and makes use of complex empirical methods in order to measure actual growth or risks, or at least to reduce uncertainty about it. These are typical tasks of the executive and legislative branches of government because they have both the knowledge and expertise, and the necessary legitimacy to make such assessments. They need to run for re-election sooner or later, or to assume responsibility for bad assessments and resign. By contrast, the perspective of the judiciary is retrospective. It is well understood that courts do not possess the legitimacy for second-guessing decisions involving high degrees of uncertainty about the future, 20 and that they are not equipped for such tasks. For these reasons, the FCC regularly grants the executive and the legislature a wide margin of discretion. 21 In the case at hand, where the FCC reviews measures of the ECB, it has reason to grant the latter an even wider margin of discretion because its decision affects the entire Eurozone and not just Germany, as Judge Lübbe-Wolff emphasizes on the basis of an integration-friendly, pro-European understanding of the Basic Law's concept of democracy. 22 First, as Judge Gerhardt observes, the duty of the ECB to achieve price stability is defined in Article 127(1) TFEU as a goal, not as a behavioral obligation. 23 That leaves deliberately open by which instruments this goal is to be achieved. 24 Second, to make things more complicated, the concept of "price stability" is rather undefined, leaving the meaning of the goal to be pursued somewhat in the dark. Usually, the central bank defines what it understands as price stability. The ECB, which was among the first central banks to make its definition public, understands price stability as "inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term."
25 Both of these points seriously call into question whether the FCC or any other court might actually carry out a full review.
Third, and most importantly, the concept of price stability is subject to a lively debate in economics. Participants in this debate are divided over the relationship between monetary policy and other forms of economic policy. While both sides would agree that price stability and financial stability are empirically interrelated, questions arise as to the normative consequences to be derived thereof. On the one hand, the approach which follows-what one might call the "separation theorem"-favors a monetary policy that largely disregards other policy objectives like financial stability or fiscal policy. 26 Jan Tinbergen was among the first to propose that different aspects of economic policy such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the maintenance of financial stability should be singled 23 OMT Ruling at para. 17 (Gerhardt, J., dissenting). G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 02
out and assigned to different regulators that should put their main focus on one task.
27
This matched well with Milton Friedman's monetary theory which teaches that the quantity of money should develop steadily and in accordance with a strict rule rather than in a discretionary fashion in order to achieve economic growth. 28 Political slack and the influence of interest group pressure might prevent central banks from observing this rule. Friedman therefore argued that central banks should be independent from government. 29 Although Friedman's theory received many modifications, such as John Taylor's rule for a growth-dependent interest rate policy, 30 the reasons for central bank independence still inform much of modern monetary policy and sustain the separation theorem. On that basis, many economists reject the OMT Programme.
31
On the other hand, the separation theorem, which has never remained uncontested by the more Keynesian economists, 32 has come under pressure since the beginning of the present crisis. A number of economists challenge it, arguing that central banks should give more weight to issues of financial stability in their policy decisions, and thereby taking greater account of interdependencies among the various fields of economic policy. 33 They emphasize the importance of observing the development of the volumes of private and public credit. Before the crisis, the prevention of credit bubbles or crunches was not considered to be the business of the central bank, but rather of financial regulation and supervisory authorities. However, there is an intrinsic relationship between monetary policy and credit markets. Low monetary policy rates might fuel credit bubbles, such as in a situation where growth in the entire economy remains below growth in one sector of the economy. Consequently, central bank policy affects financial stability. 34 
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for the present case is that the reverse situation is also true: If credit remains below the level necessary for expected growth, there is a risk of deflation. This is the effect of the socalled "bank lending channel," the increase and decrease in the quantity of money due to the growth or contraction of the volume of credit. 35 Furthermore, regulatory policy affects monetary policy because it influences the lending activities of banks and thereby the quantity of money. According to this view, what is required is the "joint optimization" of policies pursued by different agencies. If the central bank discards issues of financial stability, it risks ruining its legitimacy. 36 One might call this the "interdependence theorem." It finds already some reflection in practice, whether in the OMT Programme or in the augmentation of supervisory tasks of central banks.
37
The prohibition of primary market purchases of government debt in Article 123(1) TFEU also gives rise to disagreement between the separation and interdependence theorems. On its face, it explicitly prohibits only primary market purchases of sovereign bonds, but one might argue that secondary market purchases should also be prohibited to the extent that they might undermine the prohibition of primary market purchases. 38 However, secondary market purchases of sovereign debt are a common feature of the ECB's open market refinancing operations, usually in the form of repurchase agreements. Distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate secondary market purchases therefore requires a reconsideration of the limits of monetary policy. This leads directly to the same dispute among diverging schools of economic thought as the concept of price stability.
When judges engage in a full review of central bank policy, they may have difficulty getting around this dispute. Whatever the mandate of the central bank is, they will have to engage with the underlying, highly contested and indeterminate economic concepts like price stability, or the precise delimitation of monetary politics and its relation to issues related to financial stability. 39 However, judges usually do not possess the qualification or legitimacy to adjudicate economics. 40 
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 02 might compromise its legitimacy when its views are contested by those with more expertise on the issue. Likewise, making the economic issues at stake look uncontroversial involves the identical risk, especially because the expert testimonies solicited by the FCC reveal fundamental disagreement. 41 To avoid this risk, it would be wise for judges to review ECB measures with some restraint.
III. Rationality Check Instead of Full Review
The concept of democracy in the Basic Law as well as the intricacies of the mandate of the ECB hence strongly suggest a good dose of judicial self-restraint when reviewing ECB measures. 42 However, that raises the question where the line should be drawn. While full review appears inappropriate, full discretion would be incompatible with Article 35 of the ECB Statute, which explicitly provides for judicial review of ECB measures, as well as with the constitutional law of the member states.
In between these two extreme positions, the FCC might take recourse to rationality checks. In a theoretical perspective, rationality checks lend themselves to the present situation. They are situated in the middle between legal theories that assume the existence of a "single right answer" to any legal question and consequently favor full judicial review, 43 and legal theories that are skeptical of law's rationality and therefore consider judges as mere procedural "referees" that should not engage in substantive arguments. 44 Advocates of rationality checks consider the former view as incompatible with a pluralistic society where one might rationally disagree about the values underlying a certain policy, 45 and the latter view as normatively insufficient for law to ensure its integrative function in a pluralistic society that is supposed to express the common interest which everybody can agree with and not just the self-interest of the prevailing interest group. 46 What is meant by rationality checks that fall short of full reviews, but exceed mere procedural control? According to Sunstein, rationality checks of the legislature require legislation to be based on a "reasoned analysis" of the problem at stake and the proposed solution, thereby ensuring that legislation pursues public and not private interests. 
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However, it is difficult to legitimately distinguish between public and private reasons. Another starting point for an understanding of rationality checks might be Habermas' proposal to disentangle the different types of reasons characterizing law-generating (as opposed to law-applying) discourses. 48 Law-generating discourses may include moral arguments of universal applicability, ethical arguments that define and relate to the selfunderstanding of the respective community, and pragmatic arguments that represent compromise among the self-interests of various groups. 49 Therefore, judicial review of legislation needs to respect the pragmatic, ethical, and moral choices of the legislature. Courts may only review whether the discursive requirements which ensure that legislative procedures are rationally acceptable have been respected. 50 These discursive requirements comprise more than just the legislative procedure, but the entirety of procedural, institutional, and deliberative requirements necessary in a democratic society, including human rights. 51 The FCC has followed this approach in a number of cases in which it did not doubt the policy reasons of the legislature, but in which it reviewed whether legislative acts followed these policy reasons in a consistent and coherent manner 52 or whether the legislature observed a transparent and comprehensible procedure.
53
By contrast, the judicial review of law-applying discourses like court decisions needs to respect the pragmatic, ethical, and moral decisions of the legislature and may not replace them with their own. Judges might take recourse to these reasons in order to interpret the law and ensure its consistent application. 54 In principle, the same considerations apply to executive decisions to the extent that their legal basis spells out the relevant moral, ethical and pragmatic decisions. Courts may therefore replace the legal reasoning of the administration that puts the law into practice with their own reasoning. 55 However, the 48 On the difference between law-generating and law-applying discourses, see HABERMAS, supra note 45, at 212. 54 See Hartz IV at 235-6. 55 See Hartz IV at 231.
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56
The decisions required from the ECB under Article 127(1) TFEU, as well as the limitations applicable to its measures under Article 123(1) TFEU, resemble the latter type of activity.
As the previous sections reveal, a contextual interpretation of these provisions that pays heed to both the institutional position of the ECB and the theoretical implications of its mandate, shows that they charge the ECB with a good deal of pragmatic, ethical and maybe even moral reasoning and only define some outer limits. Within these boundaries, courts may not replace the ECB's moral, ethical or pragmatic reasons with their own reasons. They may only exercise a rationality check and ask whether the presuppositions of such discourses have been observed, i.e. whether the act in question is rationally justifiable in a deliberative sense, bearing in mind the possibility of rational disagreement.
C. Full Review vs. Rationality Check: Reviewing the FCC's Arguments
This section reviews the FCC's arguments and asks whether they cross the limits of judicial review spelled out above. It shows that the decision of the ECB might appear incoherent from the point of view of the separation theorem, but is coherent and rationally justifiable if one follows the interdependence theorem. Since the applicable treaty provisions do not render the interdependence theorem rationally unjustifiable, but leave this choice to the ECB, the FCC appears to have overstepped the appropriate limits of judicial review.
I. The Argument about Direct vs. Indirect Policy Objectives
A first objection to the standard of review applied by the FCC relates to the distinction it draws between direct and indirect policy objectives. In the opinion of the FCC, a measure cannot be qualified as one of monetary policy unless it directly pursues monetary policy objectives. Indirect monetary policy objectives are irrelevant. 57 The FCC thereby draws a converse argument from the ECJ's finding in Pringle, according to which the European Stability Mechanism qualifies as an economic policy measure because it affects monetary policy only indirectly. 58 Although it remains unclear how the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" monetary policy goals is to be understood exactly, the argument follows the 56 See Hartz IV at 233. 57 See OMT Ruling at para. 64. 58 Cf. Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12 at paras. 56, 57.
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Adjudicating Economics? 275 separation theorem quite obviously. It analyzes each measure separately and asks whether it pursues the objective of price stability in the first place. A measure pursuing a goal other than monetary policy is not within the ECB's mandate, even if price stability, the goal of monetary policy, is still safeguarded on the whole. 59 The interdependence theory would prefer a more holistic assessment of ECB measures, keeping in mind that Article 127(1) TFEU formulates price stability as a goal only. Accordingly, price stability-however it is to be defined-needs to prevail on the whole over other policy objectives. 60 However, this does not exclude that the ECB takes measures pursuing the goal of financial stability in the short term so long as it generally pursues a policy aimed at price stability in the medium term. 61 This position would be compatible with the view that price stability and other objectives are closely interrelated and sometimes hard to distinguish. In contrast to the view of the FCC, it is meaningless to ask, under the interdependence theorem, whether an individual measure pursues monetary policy directly or indirectly because what matters is the policy of the ECB as a whole. One therefore cannot invert the conclusions of the Pringle judgment. If a measure qualifies as one of economic policy, it does not mean that it might not be a legitimate objective of monetary policy. The ECB may take such measures as long as they do not affect price stability on the whole.
On a side note, the question whether price stability is affected on the whole might receive two different answers, depending on the relevant time frame. On the one hand, one might argue that the OMT Programme does not compromise price stability even in the short term. 62 On the other hand, one might argue that price stability still prevails if one modifies its definition in order to allow for short-term inflation rates of above 2% while maintaining that rate as a long-term objective. 63 The treaty provisions do not prescribe a numerical medium-term inflation rate. Rather, they leave the ECB discretion to define the key terms of its policy. 64 While one might easily find economic reasons against this latter view, one 276 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 02
would have a hard time arguing that it is rationally unjustified because it violates essential discursive requirements.
II. The Argument about Irrational Interest Rates and Selectivity
A second objection to the standard of review applied by the FCC relates to two of its arguments that have a lot in common. The first argument is that the unusually high interest rates which the ECB attempts to reduce with its OMT Programme are the result of solvency problems caused by excessive debt and show that market discipline is working.
65
Any disturbance of the market for sovereign debt would be the rule rather than the exception in a debt crisis. 66 A second, related argument suggests that the selectivity of the OMT Programme, which limits asymmetrical secondary market purchases to troubled states, shows that the real issue is solvency, not liquidity and the transmission mechanism.
67 This position presupposes, in line with the separation theorem, that the ECB may try to fix either solvency problems or liquidity problems such as a troubled monetary transmission mechanism, and that the two objectives can be neatly distinguished.
Again, the interdependence theorem would suggest the contrary. Accordingly, there is a rational basis for the presumption that solvency and liquidity concerns might converge in times of crisis. Thus, measures that pursue monetary policy objectives would be rationally justifiable even if they fix solvency problems at the same time, provided that price stability prevails on the whole. It would be difficult to challenge that view empirically and argue that secondary market purchases of sovereign bonds of troubled states only pursue solvency concerns, since there is at least some evidence for liquidity problems, i.e. for an irrational credit crunch. 68 As the Bundesbank submitted, it is hard to tell liquidity from solvency problems, or rational from irrational interest rates. 69 In such a situation, some degree of judicial self-restraint under a rationality check model seems to suggest itself. At least as long as the ECB is able to sterilize potential purchases under the OMT Programme for the foreseeable future, it would be premature for any court to intervene.
